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Abstract 
This article offers a full-length evaluation of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
decisive December 2015 Nairobi ministerial conference.  It examines the dynamics of 
the meeting, the emergence of a new negotiating mode, and the contestations between 
key developing and developed members; it explores the substance of the deal 
negotiated; and it reflects on the future capacity of the WTO to serve as a means of 
securing trade gains for developing and least developed countries.  Three arguments are 
advanced.  First, the use of a new mode of negotiating brought participation and 
consensus into the core of the Nairobi talks, but it also resulted in an agreement that 
moves away from the pursuit of universal agreements to one wherein more narrowly 
focused piecemeal deals can be brokered.  Second, the package of trade measures 
agreed continues an established pattern of asymmetrical trade deals that favour 
developed members over their developing and least developed counterparts.  Third, 
Nairobi alters fundamentally the likely shape of future WTO deals with significant 
consequences for developing country trade gains.  The likely result is that while Nairobi 
will energise the multilateral system it will do so in a way that is of questionable value to 
developing and least developed countries. 
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The WTO in Nairobi 
The demise of the Doha Development Agenda and the future of the multilateral trading system 
 
Rorden Wilkinson, Erin Hannah and James Scott* 
 
In mid-December 2015, World Trade Organization (WTO) members gathered in 
Nairobi, Kenya for the organisation’s 10th ministerial conference (MC10—see table 1).  
Their aim was to resolve a stalemate that had emerged over the purpose and focus of 
the WTO’s negotiating function and the continued viability of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA, or more commonly Doha round).  With the help of two through-the-
night negotiations MC10 saw members reach an agreement that marks the beginning 
of a new phase in the evolution of the multilateral trading system, the role developing 
countries will play therein, and the likely gains that will accrue as a result. 
 
Table 1—WTO Ministerial Conferences 
Nairobi (MC10) 15-18 December 2015 
Bali (MC9) 3-6 December 2013 
Geneva (MC8) 15-17 December 2011 
Geneva (MC7) 30 November - 2 December 2009 
Hong Kong (MC6) 13-18 December 2005 
Cancún (MC5) 10-14 September 2003 
Doha (MC4) 9-13 November 2001 
Seattle (MC3) 30 November – 3 December 1999 
Geneva (MC2) 18-20 May 1998 
Singapore (MC1) 9-13 December 1996 
 
Three aspects mark Nairobi out among WTO ministerial conferences.  First, the 
agreement reached transforms fundamentally the framework for conducting trade 
negotiations for the first time in the WTO’s history moving it away from one targeted 
at broad-based universal deals via a “single undertaking” to something more lithe and 
multi-faceted (commonly understood as “variable geometry”).  This transformation is 
widely seen as rekindling faith in the organisation’s negotiating function and an 
 4 
important counter to the growing prominence of “mega regional” trade deals such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).  However, reinvigorating the WTO’s negotiating function came at 
the expense of the DDA and a 14-year effort to agree to a wide-ranging multilateral deal 
on trade measures for development that has been a key demand of developing 
countries and which has been crucial to securing their participation in the multilateral 
trading system.   
 
Second, Nairobi saw members utilise a new mode of negotiation.  This new mode 
builds consensus through a complex multi-layered series of bilateral processes in 
behind-the-scenes meetings targeting the least contentious issues first, thereby 
generating willingness and capital before moving on to thornier topics.  Dubbed 
“critical mass” because of the broad-based participatory and consultative approaches 
that are key components, this method targets blockages in negotiations by encouraging 
counter-proposals and dialogue with opponents.  It was universally praised at the 
meeting and was seen as crucial in helping bridge the significant pre-ministerial gaps 
that had existed between members as well as to the conclusion of an agreement.  
Elements of this approach have been used before, and older more familiar small group 
and power-political methods were deployed in the closing stages of MC10.  
Nonetheless, Nairobi witnessed the first time critical mass had been used as a wide-
ranging mode of negotiation.   
 
Third, the package of trade measures agreed in Nairobi is not inconsiderable, 
comprising agreements in agriculture and on least-developed country (LDC) issues as 
well as an expansion in the 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA). What is 
clear, however, is that in keeping with all previous multilateral trade deals—across the 
life span of the multilateral trading system and not just the WTO—the balance of these 
measures clearly favours developed countries. 
 
In combination, these three outcomes mark the beginning of a critical juncture likely to 
signal a new phase in the evolution of the multilateral trading system.  Our purposes in 
this article are: (i) to evaluate the significance of the Nairobi conference for the future 
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of the WTO with a particular concern for the organisation’s continued capacity to serve 
as a means of securing trade gains for developing and least developed countries; (ii) to 
examine the dynamics of the meeting both in terms of the emergence of a new 
negotiating mode that underpinned the conference’s success and the contestations 
between key developing and developed member states; and (iii) to explore the substance 
of the deal that was negotiated and to locate this within debate about the future of the 
multilateral trading system and of global development more generally.   
 
We advance three arguments.  First, the Nairobi outcome alters fundamentally the 
likely shape of future WTO deals with significant consequences for developing country 
trade gains.  Second, while the use of a critical mass negotiating mode brought 
participation and consensus into the core of the Nairobi talks, ironically it resulted in 
an agreement that enables members to move away from the pursuit of universal 
agreements wherein a balance of concessions is required that are acceptable to all 
members to one in which more narrowly focused piecemeal deals can be brokered.  
This approach to negotiating has a long-standing history in multilateral trade and its 
return signals a move back to a more “mini-lateral” exclusionary mode of agreeing trade 
deals that has traditionally favoured developed countries over their developing 
counterparts (Wilkinson, 2006a).  Third, the balance of the Nairobi package preserves a 
longstanding feature of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO 
negotiations which has consistently seen deals struck that favour the organisation’s 
developed members.  Moreover, the transformation of the WTO’s negotiating function 
into a much lither machinery is likely to preserve rather than attenuate this pattern.  
This does not necessarily mean that gains for the poorest and least able developing 
countries will be absent from future negotiations; but it does mean that they will almost 
certainly be of proportionately lesser value. 
 
In pursuit of our aims, we begin in the next section by exploring the background to the 
conference so that we are able to locate Nairobi in the context in which it took place 
and explain why it unfolded in the way that it did.  In the section thereafter we move to 
explore the dynamics of MC10 focusing on the areas of tension and agreement that 
emerged before examining the application of a critical mass mode of negotiation.  We 
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then examine the substance of what was agreed in Nairobi and consider its value for 
world trade. In the penultimate section we set the debate, dynamics and outcome of 
MC10 within the context of the future of the WTO and the multilateral trading 
system.  In the final section we offer our concluding comments.  
 
The run-up to MC10 
The run-up to the Nairobi ministerial conference did not suggest that a successful 
conclusion would necessarily be forthcoming.  While positive signals ahead of the 
meeting indicated that members would at least try and craft an agreement, a number of 
negative factors were also evident.  We discuss these factors in turn. 
 
Auguring well for a successful conclusion, the Nairobi meeting sought to build upon a 
successful Bali ministerial conference (MC9) which had broken with past practice and 
produced the first multilateral trade deal since the WTO was created in 1995 
(Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2014). MC10 marked the first time that a WTO 
ministerial conference had been held in Africa.  “African” issues were at the forefront 
of the agenda with strong support being shown for the conclusion of a developing 
country-led ministerial conference comprising a package of trade measures on 
agriculture and for LDCs.  Two new members (Liberia and Afghanistan) were due to be 
formally welcomed into the organisation’s ranks with a third—Somalia—submitting 
notification during the meeting of its intention to join.  And, more widely, Nairobi 
sought to capitalise on a newfound momentum evident in global summitry building on 
deals agreed in Addis Ababa on financing for development (July 2015), in New York on 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs—September 2015), and in Paris on climate 
change (December 2015). 
 
Yet, despite a preparatory process that had seen much activity in key areas, the Geneva-
based pre-ministerial process had become “stuck” on several key issues.  Expectations 
among WTO staffers in the run-up to Nairobi had been lowered as a result.1  Writing 
ahead of MC10 Michael Froman, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 
appeared to many to be calling time on the DDA.  As Froman put it, the Doha round 
was “designed in a different era, for a different era, and much has changed since”.  We 
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should now free “ourselves from the strictures of Doha …  One way or the other, this 
week’s WTO ministerial conference in Nairobi will mark the end of an era” and “what 
cannot be achieved in Nairobi will not be achieved by trying again with the same failed 
approach” (Froman, 2015).   
 
Inevitably, Froman’s comments drew strong criticism.  Financial Times world trade 
editor Shawn Donnan (2015) suggested that the USTR’s comments looked to be 
setting “the stage for an acrimonious showdown”.  Jomo Kwame Sundaram (2015) 
accused Froman of favouring “plurilateralism, bilateralism and an à la carte 
multilateralism consisting of what developed countries deem to be in developing 
countries’ interest, while ignoring the latter’s own aspirations”.  Sophia Murphy (2015) 
pleaded with the USA not to forsake multilateralism for a “19th-century echo of big 
powers trying to control international markets for themselves”.  
 
The tenor of practitioner debate in the run-up to the negotiations was no better.  
Indonesian Minister of Trade Thomas Lembong (2015), also speaking on behalf of the 
Group of 33 (G33) developing countries, openly complained about the “tone of 
negotiations” immediately prior to the opening ceremony.  A press release 
accompanying a statement by UN Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights (OHCHR, 
2015a) warned that WTO members should “not weasel out of prior commitments to 
address the needs of developing economies” and argued in the statement proper that 
“[t]here is no justification for defaulting on the Doha Round commitments … such 
action may have a detrimental impact on human rights” (OHCHR, 2015b).  EU Trade 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and Rural Development Commissioner Phil Hogan 
(2015) criticised the “worrying lack of compromise texts on the negotiating table”.  And 
MC10 conference chair and Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs Amina 
Mohamed (2015) warned that the Nairobi meeting was “the last chance for some time 
to come for the WTO to dig itself out of its negotiating stasis”.  A successful conclusion 
to the meeting was thus by no means expected. 
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Dynamics of the meeting and critical mass as a negotiating mode 
Unlike the Bali meeting, which was dramatic from the off, MC10 had a more subdued 
character.  Despite the WTO Secretariat reporting healthy NGO registrations and 
attendance rates, the tented NGO centre was largely empty and some NGO events were 
cancelled for lack of an audience.  Protests in the conference centre and on the 
surrounding streets were small, poorly attended, and attracted little attention.  Except 
for the final stages when consecutive drafts of the ministerial declaration and associated 
documents were being presented and heads of delegation meetings were called at short 
notice, the Kenyatta International Conference Centre was relatively calm and peaceful.  
Security was visible on a level that had not been seen since Hong Kong in 2005, though 
it had a more apparent than effective air and was not put to the test.  Even the well 
attended parallel ICTSD Trade and Development Symposium2 saw few controversial 
deliberations or exchanges.  
 
This appearance of relative calm was, however, the consequence of the employment of 
a new mode of negotiation rather than an absence of hardnosed negotiation or 
substantive contention.  As member states had arrived in Nairobi without a clear 
consensus and with an over full work programme comprising 15 different unsettled 
texts, a multi-layered process of concurrent bilateral meetings was put in place to build 
consensus on easier-to-reach areas before tackling the thornier issue of the future of the 
DDA as a negotiating framework.  And because this process was conducted en masse 
and behind-closed-doors often away from the conference venue it lent the ministerial a 
false appearance of calm.  Yet, as long serving WTO staffers put it, Nairobi was the 
busiest and most focused ministerial conference to date.3   
 
This new mode of negotiating was not, however, a wholesale departure from past 
practice but rather an evolution thereof.  Bilateral consultations have always played a 
significant role during multilateral trade negotiations, but these have tended to be held 
between leading protagonists (largely the principal suppliers and/or importers of 
particular goods and always including the US and EU) to the exclusion of smaller 
developing countries.  These bilateral consultations would historically then evolve into 
larger “green room” sessions involving a greater number of members but which would 
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remain confined to the leading industrial states, and more recently—in response to the 
“emergence” of large developing countries as global economic forces—India, China and 
Brazil.  At moments of intransigence, particularly during the final stages of a 
negotiation, these groups would then break back down to very small groups, almost 
always involving the US and EU with a range of other members periodically playing a 
role. 
 
In the preceding Bali ministerial conference, Director General (DG) Azevêdo sought to 
move away from this model toward one that was more inclusive in which all member 
states felt they were being consulted.  To do this he spent a good deal of MC9 
consulting a large number of delegations about their positions and red lines.  Inevitably 
some more elitist small group meetings took place and criticisms were levelled at the 
DG for what some members believed to be final texts that reflected his attempt to find 
agreement at all costs.  Nonetheless, Azevêdo’s efforts were widely applauded.   
 
Several factors made a noticeable difference to the dynamics of MC10 that combined 
to produce a new mode of negotiation and which had a significant effect on the 
outcome in Nairobi.  First, the public political theatre acted out by key trade ministers 
that was a characteristic feature of previous DDA ministerials (particularly, but not 
exclusively, Cancún, Hong Kong and Bali) was absent from Nairobi.  Very few press 
conferences were held.  Those that were convened were limited to courtesy events 
hosted for local journalists by the host country and the WTO’s own daily briefings.  
The lack of press conferences was not a sign of few differences among members, or the 
shallowness of divergence, however; rather it reflected the business-like attitude that 
permeated the conference, the lack of willingness to use public debate as a negotiating 
tactic and theatrical event for domestic audiences, and the perceived inclusiveness of 
the process.  
 
Second, from the outset there was a clear willingness to try and reach a deal.  Hosting 
the ministerial conference in Nairobi contributed to this willingness, particularly 
among developing country delegations.  Indonesian trade minister Lembong’s clear 
statement that he had no “red lines” at the conference’s opening was also important in 
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this regard, not only because of the clear can-do message it sent but also because his 
statement omitted any reference to the contentious issues around which the G33 
coalesce, namely the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and public stockholding.  
 
Third, it was clear ahead of Nairobi that the status of the DDA was both contested and 
unsettled.  Yet, rather than being the focus of debate from the outset, negotiating 
commenced on issues where agreement had already been, or was almost established 
before moving onto thornier issues.  This approach—which built a critical mass of 
agreement as the conference proceeded—continued to hold sway for the duration of the 
ministerial, even to the extent that scheduled debate on the status of the DDA 
allocated for the afternoon of 18 December (after the conclusion of MC10 had been 
pushed back) was held over until at least some tentative resolution of outstanding issues 
had been reached.  Indeed, it was not until the very last stages of the ministerial 
conference when members were trying to finalise the thorniest of issues that a move 
back to more traditional small group style negotiating was evident involving the key 
protagonists (notably bringing the Group of 5—USA, EU, China, Brazil and India—
together to resolve outstanding differences in agriculture).  The benefits of this critical 
mass approach were that it built consensus and trust among member delegations in 
areas where agreement could be reached while at the same time buying them into the 
idea that a Nairobi package could be agreed, thereby enabling them to be relatively 
sanguine about the final stage small group meetings.  A key aspect of this process was 
the active encouragement given to members by conference chair Mohamed and DG 
Azevêdo to take the initiative to talk with one another and explore solutions rather 
than to wait to be asked, react negatively during moments of disagreement, and talk 
exclusively through the Chair. 
 
Fourth, the grand and multiple coalitions evident during the earlier stages of the Doha 
negotiations—and which had evolved from the late GATT period—did not have the 
same salience or traction that they had in previous ministerial conferences.  This is not 
to say that coalitions have disappeared (both the G33 and the Cairns group of 
agricultural exporting countries were active in Nairobi for instance), but their cohesion 
has been eroded by changes in the global economy and—on the part of lesser-developed, 
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smaller, and more vulnerable members—a growing acceptance that it no longer makes 
sense to treat developing countries as one large group.  The growing acceptance of the 
need for greater sensitivity to the specific needs of individual members has rubbed 
against not only the idea that all developing countries should be treated the same way, 
it has also undermined the salience of grand coalitions like the Group of 90 (G90) 
developing and least developed countries.  It is also why smaller coalitions like the least 
developed country (LDC) group are able to retain greater coherence.  While it is the 
case that the G90 did have a presence in Nairobi, it was small.  Moreover, the smaller 
developing countries expressed a growing reluctance to line-up behind India and the 
other larger developing countries in opposing aspects of the negotiations.   
 
Fifth, the character of WTO ministerial conferences as important high level events has 
been firmly re-established after they were previously and consciously re-engineered as 
perfunctory gatherings as a tactic by former WTO DG Pascal Lamy to take some of the 
heat out of the Doha round following the 2008 collapse in the negotiations (Scott and 
Wilkinson, 2010).  The successful outcome of MC9 began this rehabilitation process.  
Nairobi cemented it.  
 
Sixth, a clear move to use social media was also evident.  During the conference a 
number of the draft texts were made available online immediately or shortly after they 
were released.  This was accompanied by a conscious call for civil society groups to 
analyse these texts to help with the process of consideration and the movement forward 
of the negotiations.  The Twitter accounts of many heads of delegation were used to 
record the number of bilateral meetings in which they had been involved in something 
close to real time.  This illustrated the degree of seriousness with which delegations 
from all countries were treated—rather than just the select few that would have been 
invited into green room discussion in previous years—as well as the extent of the 
industry taking place.  In some instances, the Twitter posts were little more than vanity 
exercises and were often accompanied by pictures of heads of delegation meeting or 
embracing.  In others, they provided a window into the broad-based consultative 
aspects of the critical mass approach.  This was particularly important in regard to the 
Twitter feed of Amina Mohamed, MC10’s chair, in its illustration of the number and 
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variety of meetings in which she was engaged.  The downside, however, was the 
noticeable damning of certain country positions on Twitter as the negotiations moved 
towards a conclusion, exemplified by the emergence of two hash-tags #Indiablockstalks 
and #USblockstalks. 
 
Seventh, although at the Bali Ministerial conference the Chair of the negotiations, 
Indonesian trade minister Gita Wirjawan, played a considerable role, much of the 
success of MC9 was attributed to the number and extent of the bilateral consultations 
that WTO DG Roberto Azevêdo convened.  In Nairobi, while Azevêdo continued to 
play a major role—not least in shepherding the ITA across the line—it was Amina 
Mohamed that led on the bilateral consultations.  In so doing, she was able to draw 
upon the widespread credibility invested in her role and the relative distance she 
enjoyed from the secretariat—albeit at the sacrifice of large amounts of sleep during 
conference. 
 
Eighth, a conscious effort—both rhetorically and substantively—was made to move 
beyond the North/South divide that had historically bifurcated trade negotiations.  
Amina Mohamed went to great lengths to stress this during her 18 December press 
conference, and a large number of delegates and observers corroborated this in private 
conversations. 
 
The move to a critical mass approach did not mean, however, that the practices of the 
past were entirely absent or that the negotiations were unproblematic.  Capital to 
capital phone calls designed to push through agreement were much in evidence on the 
18 December including from British Prime Minister David Cameron to India Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi.  Agenda stacking was also evident with key players tabling 
texts on new issues or contentious areas late in the day in the knowledge that these 
would be withdrawn as part of a bargain for movement elsewhere.  This was the case, 
for example, with the introduction of language in the fisheries text by India referring to 
the 2005 Hong Kong decision in the knowledge that this would not pass muster with 
the USA; Brazil’s introduction of a text dated 17 December but circulated on the 
morning of 18 December on regional trade agreements (WTO, 2015e); and with the 
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raising of suggestions that some now established members—including China and more 
recent acceded states such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Oman—should be 
permitted to accept no or lower commitments because of the disciplines they adopted 
as part of their accession processes (Bridges, 2015b).  Moreover, when the talks overran 
the planned endpoint of midday 18 December and entered the crunch stage, the mode 
of negotiation did revert to the more traditional exclusive, small group approach. This 
irritated other members who felt they should be included and also precipitated the 
small presence of protesting NGOs to highlight the reversion back to a more 
undemocratic and exclusionary methods. 
 
The substantive package 
Much of the substance of the negotiations that takes place at ministerial conferences 
focuses on the content of texts.  The debates that ensue can often seem to be petty 
point scoring exercises, but for member states formulations of words play a key role in 
their political interactions.  Often first draft formulations comprise strong statements 
of position that are designed to make a point but which are inevitably watered down as 
members move towards a consensus.  This movement toward more “vanilla” positions 
was evident across all of the issues where agreement was reached in Nairobi.  We 
discuss the substance and consequence of this textual jousting below. 
 
The Information Technology Agreement 
The most substantive agreement reached in Nairobi—the ITA—also happened to be the 
first tariff reduction deal achieved in a WTO negotiation. This is a plurilateral 
agreement signed by 53 members to eliminate tariffs in 201 sector-identified products. 
Collectively the signatories account for approximately 90 per cent of global trade in the 
products covered.  The WTO calculates that there is US$1.3 trillion of trade per year in 
those products, amounting to 10 per cent of total global trade (WTO, 2015g).  In 
theory, all other members benefit even if they are not party to the agreement.  This is 
because the tariff cuts are also “multilateralised”, thus granting tariff free access to the 
markets of all WTO members.  However, this has to be placed within the context of the 
fact that almost all non-signatories do not produce the products covered by the ITA 
and are therefore being granted trade concessions in areas in which they have no 
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capacity to export.  The ITA is undoubtedly economically significant, but any claim that 
it will benefit those developing countries that are not sector producers and/or exporters 
must be treated with caution. 
 
Agriculture 
Agriculture has often been the central focus of WTO ministerial conferences.  The 
preceding Uruguay round (1986-1994) was concluded with an acknowledgement that 
its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) had not achieved a sufficient outcome.  To 
overcome this problem the agreement included a “built-in agenda” mandating new 
negotiations to begin by 1999 aimed at “continuing the process of substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection” (AoA, Article 20).  As the developing 
world woke up to the inequalities of the Uruguay round and the problems of how it 
was being implemented by developed countries (Akram, 2001), the weakness of the 
AoA became more pronounced.  While the precise details have changed over time, 
ministerial conferences became moments wherein entrenched divisions are expressed 
between (mostly) developed countries wishing to protect their agricultural sectors and 
domestic support programmes, and those (mostly developing) countries wanting to see 
reductions therein and rebalance the AoA.  MC10 was no different.  
 
Without the prospect of significant forward movement on a comprehensive deal on 
market access and domestic support, the focus in Nairobi was on three elements of 
agricultural trade: export subsidies; the SSM; and public stockholding.  Within the 
context of trying to secure a development-focused outcome from the ministerial, there 
was hope that some agreement could be formed on these areas of particular interest to 
developing countries.  We outline each below.  
 
Nairobi offered an opportunity to lock in US and EU reductions in the use of export 
subsidies.  Reform of agricultural support programmes coupled with historically high 
food prices seen after the 2008 financial crisis led both the USA and EU to all but 
eliminate their use of export subsidies (WTO, 2014).  As WTO members looked to 
deliver a development-focused outcome in Nairobi, an opportunity was sensed for 
securing an agreement that locked this into place.  While this had relatively broad 
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support, there was a feeling among some members (including the EU) that an 
agreement in this area needed to tackle not just direct export subsidies but also other 
programmes that have a similar effect—notably food aid and export credit guarantees.  
This broader collection became known as “export competition”. On 16 November 
2015 the EU and Brazil, joined by Argentina, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Moldova, proposed a draft text on export competition (WTO, 2015a).  Heading to 
Nairobi, the USA—which makes significant use of the indirect supports included under 
export competition—opposed this move but they were far from alone in doing so.  As is 
increasingly the case within the WTO the issue did not divide along North/South 
lines.  A number of developing countries have recently started to use export subsidies in 
breach of their WTO commitments—among them India (sugar), Thailand (rice) and 
China (cotton)—and did not appreciate the sudden focus on export competition. 
 
The second pillar of agriculture—the SSM—was pushed most strongly by India and the 
G33.  The SSM has been presented by its proponents as a measure to correct existing 
“safeguard” provisions that allow increased protection when faced with a sudden, 
disruptive increase in imports and which are available only to those countries that have 
already converted non-tariff barriers into tariffs—a process few developing countries 
have undertaken.  The 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration accepted that 
developing countries should have recourse to a similar mechanism that was termed the 
“Special Safeguard Mechanism” (Wilkinson, 2006b).  Over subsequent years a number 
of proposals were put forward but common ground proved hard to find with the SSM 
playing a key role in the 2008 collapse of the DDA (Wolfe, 2009).  
 
In the run-up to Nairobi the G33 put forward a new proposal on the SSM but it had 
little effect.  Chair of the Agriculture Committee, Vangelis Vitalis, noted ahead of 
MC10 that many members had “expressed strong opposition to the idea of an outcome 
on SSM at MC10 in the absence of a broader outcome on agriculture market access” 
and concluded that the negotiations “had reached an impasse” (WTO, 2015b: 2).  
Nonetheless, the G33 continued to consider the SSM to be “a balancing element in 
relation to other potential outcomes for Nairobi” (WTO, 2015b: 2). 
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The third pillar of agriculture discussed was public stockholding.  As with the SSM and 
export competition, the issue made little progress in Geneva and was sent to Nairobi 
for consideration by ministers.  This issue had formed the most controversial element 
of the 2013 Bali package, as some developing countries led by India pushed for an 
amendment to the AoA that would facilitate programmes of purchasing food for 
distribution to the poor at highly subsidised rates.  Bali ended with a temporary 
agreement and a stipulation that work would be done to find a more permanent 
solution.  Heading to Nairobi, the G33 pushed for agreement on that more permanent 
solution, while others continued to see this as impossible in the absence of a more 
complete DDA package.  
 
By the emergence of the first draft agriculture text (WTO, 2015c) on the 17 December 
it had become clear that India’s demand for an outcome on the SSM was not going to 
be delivered.  The final decision on the SSM dealt with the issue in three lines, stating 
that “developing country Members will have the right to have recourse to a special 
safeguard mechanism (SSM) as envisaged under paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration”, and that negotiations would continue to that effect in the 
Committee on Agriculture Special Session (WTO, 2015e).  Public stockholding was 
dealt with in a similar fashion, consisting merely of a reaffirmation that the Bali 
decision would remain in force until a permanent solution was agreed, that 
negotiations toward that end would continue “in an accelerated time-frame”, and that 
the General Council would regularly review progress (WTO, 2015f). 
 
Progress was greatest on the export competition pillar, albeit it limited largely to export 
subsidies.  A timetable was set for the elimination of export subsidies—by 2020 for 
developed and 2023 for developing countries—with an accelerated timescale in cotton.  
On the broader areas of export competition the language was primarily of a best 
endeavour nature.  Providing food aid in-kind was allowed to continue, though the 
agreement encouraged members to provide such aid in cash.  Several paragraphs were 
devoted to trying to control the monetisation of food aid,4 requiring a “demonstrable 
need for monetisation” and an analysis of local or regional markets to minimise 
disruption.  However, given the lack of clarity around such conditions it is questionable 
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how effective they will be.  Oxfam America’s Gawain Kripke commented, “[t]he 
proposal does not move away from tied food aid programs and would not exert any 
pressure to reform the status quo” (Bridges, 2015a). 
 
Overall, the package on agriculture made an important step forward in banning export 
subsidies.  This element was lauded by DG Azevêdo in the closing ceremony as being 
“truly historic” and “the WTO’s most significant decision on agriculture”, completing a 
task that “had been outstanding since export subsidies were banned for manufactured 
goods 50 years ago” (Azevêdo, 2015).  The large-scale use of export subsidies has 
historically had a detrimental impact on domestic markets in developing countries and 
harmed their long-term food security by undermining domestic production and 
eliminating damaging policies is certainly welcomed.  Beyond this, however, the 
outcome in Nairobi had little substance.  The policy changes demanded by many food 
importing developing countries relating to protecting their food security—namely the 
SSM and public stockholding—continue to be parked on a work programme (the DDA) 
that now looks unlikely to be concluded. 
 
LDC issues  
In advance of Nairobi, the LDC group had identified four main priority areas—the 
LDC services waiver; preferential rules of origin; cotton; and duty-free, quota-free 
market access (DFQF) (WTO, 2015d).  Each of these items were included as key 
elements of the 2013 Bali LDC package but only as a series of non-binding, best 
endeavour commitments.  
 
In 2013 members promised to expedite the operationalisation of the services waiver 
which would allow members to grant preferential treatment to service suppliers from 
LDCs, something that had been agreed in principle in 2011 at MC8.  By Nairobi, only 
21 members had notified the WTO of their intention to make use of the waiver and 
LDCs expressed concern that they were not “commercially meaningful enough” (WTO 
2015d).  In the run up to Nairobi, the LDC group sought to encourage more members 
to make use of the waiver, deepen coverage and expand the scope of existing 
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notifications.  The waiver was set to expire in 2026, 15 years from its adoption on 17 
December 2011.  
 
The decision adopted in Nairobi reiterated members’ commitment to support the 
development of services sectors and modes of supply in LDCs and explicitly 
acknowledged the three-year lag between the adoption of the waiver and the first 
notification.  In response, members extended the waiver until December 2030.  Beyond 
this, members simply agreed to “redouble” efforts to operationalise the waiver, were 
“encouraged” to extend technical assistance and capacity building to LDC services 
providers, and committed to the periodic review of the operation of notified 
preferences (WTO, 2015h).  Regulatory issues (such as administrative procedures and 
recognition of the qualifications of LDC professionals and the accreditation of LDC 
institutions) were deemed too politically sensitive to be addressed at Nairobi and left 
out of the final decision.  Given the non-binding nature of the decision, realising these 
aims depends on the good will and initiative of members. 
 
Also included in the LDC list of priorities was simplifying and making more effective 
the rules of origin used in preference schemes (WTO, 2015d).  Though LDCs and 
other developing countries have a wide range of preference schemes available to 
encourage exports to the world’s major markets, restrictive rules of origin—that is, rules 
relating to which products can be classified as having been made within the preference 
receiving country and therefore eligible for lower tariffs—greatly reduce the use of these 
schemes.  At Bali, preference-giving members made only non-binding commitments to 
adopt more generous rules of origin practices and initiate work to create a more 
comprehensive and binding future agreement on the issue.  This had clearly changed 
prior to Nairobi.  Despite US reluctance in the run-up to MC10, this was one of the 
first issues on which agreement was reached. 
 
A binding (and therefore legally enforceable) agreement delivered rules of origin as the 
major achievement for LDCs and, indeed, development, at MC10.  Most significantly, 
one component of the agreement saw preference-granting members agree to grant 
standard (as opposed to variable) preferential treatment for LDC export products and 
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reduce administrative burdens on LDCs.  The agreement allows 75 per cent of the final 
value of export products to contain materials not originating from an LDC to qualify 
for preferential treatment.  Members also agreed to reduce the administrative burdens 
on LDCs and to implement the new commitments in the agreement very quickly, by 
December 2016 (WTO, 2015i).  While some consider this threshold still to be too 
restrictive, and it remains to be seen whether it enables LDCs to utilise preference 
schemes fully, there is no doubt that this agreement provides LDCs with much greater 
flexibility.  The decision on rules of origin is also now among the small handful of 
legally binding, multilateral decisions ever taken by the WTO. 
 
Cotton was another perennial LDC issue on the agenda at MC10.  The “Cotton Four” 
(C4—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali), in particular, have long sought duty free 
quota free access for cotton exports from LDCs, the elimination of export subsidies, 
and the reduction of domestic support, especially by developed countries, in the sector.  
In the run-up to MC10, the C4 again articulated these demands in an effort to move 
beyond the weak commitment made at Bali to improve linkages between cotton and 
the aid for trade agenda.  Indeed, the C4 proposal provided the basis for talks on the 
first day of MC10.  
 
The decision adopted in Nairobi goes some distance towards fulfilling these demands.  
Developed and developing countries (where able to do so) have both committed to 
eliminating export subsidies in cotton as well as providing DFQF to LDCs as part of 
their existing preference trade agreements.  However, the most trade distorting 
measures—domestic supports—proved too politically contentious to be addressed.  What 
is more, many critics are of the view that developing countries should not be required 
to cut their export subsidies at all, in light to the unfair terms of trade they have 
contended with for many decades.  What this means is that, while a binding decision 
has been taken and the C4 text was used as a basis, only small steps have been taken to 
redress the egregious asymmetries in global trade in cotton.  
 
Overall, the LDC package is historic and significant in that legally binding 
commitments were taken to fulfil long standing, best endeavour promises made by 
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industrialised countries to the world’s poorest members.  However, when considered in 
light of yet-unmet commitments on DFQF market access for products other than 
cotton and the lack of meaningful opportunities for services exports, it fails to bring 
balance to the broader Nairobi package. 
 
The future of the multilateral trading system 
While substantive issues took the lead on the agenda for much of the early discussion, 
one lurked in the background but which ultimately framed the entire meeting—the 
future of the Doha round.  The most contentious aspects of the debate during MC10 
focused on the relationship between parts 1 and 3 of the draft ministerial declaration, 
relating to the preamble and post-Nairobi programme of work.  Debate on the 
preamble focused on whether or not the ministerial declaration should reaffirm the 
DDA thereby retaining it as the framework for future WTO negotiations.  The USA 
and the EU, with much less vocal but nonetheless significant support from a large 
number of other members, arrived in Nairobi clear that the DDA no longer presented 
a viable means of moving the multilateral trading system forward, arguing that it 
precluded the membership from discussing new issues.  They argued that Doha froze in 
time what members could discuss, and without a new framework for negotiating gains 
in new sectors could only be achieved in other (principally plurilateral and mega-
regional) fora.  Conversely, India and the G33 argued that because there was much that 
was unfinished from the Doha round it should be retained and used as the framework 
for negotiating until all other issues had been resolved.   
 
Part way though the meeting the idea emerged that the ministerial declaration should 
reflect the differing circumstances in which members found themselves and their 
capacity to move forward with an agenda that was almost a decade and a half old.  The 
result was a decision to recognise these differences and, in the post-Nairobi work 
programme, to permit members to pursue negotiations in areas of interest to them on 
the basis of plurilateral negotiations.  New issues would require the consent of the 
membership as a whole if they were to be launched multilaterally. 
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The consequences of this decision are significant and break with a near 40-year desire 
to conclude negotiations in the GATT/WTO on a universal basis.  Not only does the 
decision re-introduce a framework for negotiation that permits the conclusion of small 
group agreements that had been a feature of almost all of the trade rounds prior to 
Uruguay, it amounts to a recognition that the pursuit of universal agreements like the 
DDA is too difficult particularly without the kind of institutional bargain that enabled 
the Uruguay round to be concluded (see Wilkinson, 2015).  This, in turn, reduces the 
capacity of developing countries to secure trade-offs from developed countries in return 
for concessions in new areas, as the Uruguay round had enabled when agreements in 
services, intellectual property rights, and investment measures, among other things, had 
been given in return for the AoA, textiles and clothing, and extended special and 
differential treatment. 
 
Part of the rationale for launching the DDA on the basis of a single undertaking was to 
enable developing countries to secure implementation anomalies and agreements in 
unfinished areas (particularly in agriculture) concluded in exchange for any movement 
forward elsewhere.  Yet, almost from the outset the DDA ran into trouble with 
members being unable to reach agreement before the round collapsed in 2008 with the 
Bali ministerial agreement producing the only multilateral agreement of the Doha 
round.  While it is the case that the Nairobi ministerial declaration commits members 
to the pursuit of development gains by other means, the only compunction to complete 
Doha is if there is a desire to open up negotiations in new areas on a multilateral basis. 
 
The great irony here is that the new negotiating mode delivered a ministerial outcome 
that was more inclusive and participatory than ever before.  However, what was agreed 
ensures that this broad-based inclusiveness involving the membership as a whole is 
likely only to be used again should a return to a universal endeavour arise.  This is not 
to say that future negotiations will not be more inclusive; rather it is to acknowledge 
that any deals negotiated in the near to medium-term will be done in the context of 
agreements that include only a subset of members.  It is thus the case that greater 
participation has delivered a more exclusionary negotiating frame, and this was agreed 
at the first ministerial meeting that was held in an African country. 
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Conclusion 
The future for the WTO and the multilateral trading system is thus mixed. On the one 
hand, it is clear that the Nairobi outcome will energise the multilateral system and 
enable the WTO to preside over future agreements.  On the other hand, in the absence 
of a universal endeavour there is very little to force developed countries to focus on 
negotiations that are of specific interest to their developing counterparts.  Furthermore, 
as the Doha round is now set aside the capacity of the WTO to fulfil the meagre role 
ascribed to it in the SDGs is impossible to meet.  All we can hope for is that members 
make good on their commitment to pursue development gains by other means.  The 
history of the Doha round and of the multilateral trading system more generally tells us 
that we should not hold our breath. 
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United Nations System (ACUNS—Scott and Wilkinson) and Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP—
Hannah). Erin Hannah and James Scott would like to thank the Canadian Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council for funding to attend.  Rorden Wilkinson would like to thank the ESRC 
Impact Accelerator Fast Track Engagement Scheme for its part in funding his participation in the 
ministerial conference and related side events. 
1 Private conversations between authors and anonymous WTO secretariat officials and members of 
delegations from South Africa and Bangladesh, 18 December 2015. 
2 See http://tds.ictsd.org for details.  
3 Anonymous private conversations with the authors, 17 December 2015.  Also, Keith Rockwell, Press 
Conference, 17 December 2015. 
4 Monetisation of food aid refers to the selling of donated food into overseas markets.  US law requires 
that a minimum of 15 per cent of nonemergency food aid be monetised to support private voluntary 
organisations, but in practice approximately 60 per cent is used in this way.  There are a number of 
negative consequences of food monetisation, including the distortion of local markets and undermining 
of local production, increased price volatility and diversion of food away from those most in need, who 
cannot afford to purchase food on the open market (Barrett and Lentz, 2009).  
